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RESPONSE TO NEW MATTER RAISED IN REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Mr. Yates takes issue with the Reighards' citations to certain pretrial memoranda 
and affidavits in their Brief of Appellees and Cross-Appellants. The Reighards find this 
curious as Mr. Yates similarly cited pretrial memoranda and affidavits in 19 of the 20 
"Statement of Facts" in the Brief of Appellant.1 Further curious is the fact that Mr. Yates 
himself cites to both the Affidavit of Suzy Reighard and the Affidavit of Alan Reighard 
in his Brief of Appellant, yet criticizes the Reighards for citation to same. (See Reply 
Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee at p.3, fn. 1.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Yates states that he sought to strike the offending affidavits, but 
that "the court never ruled on these motions." (See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee at p.3, fn. 1.) This is inaccurate. The trial court did rule on Mr. Yates' 
motions to strike the subject affidavits, when it set forth in its June 19, 2008 Ruling and 
Order, "The court is aware of what evidence and affirmations are admissible and will not 
strike any portions of these declarations..." (R.782)(emphasis added). In any event, the 
subject affidavits and declarations cited by the Reighards (and Mr. Yates) are not 
inconsistent with the testimony introduced at trial. Further, Mr. Yates does not dispute 
1
 Mr. Yates' "Facts" Nos. 1 through 7 refer to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss Contract (2nd and 3rd) Causes of Action. Mr. Yates' such motion was 
denied. (R.779-80) Mr. Yates' "Facts" No. 8 refers to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Negligence Claim (1st 
Cause of Action). Mr. Yates' such motion was denied. (R.776-78) Mr. Yates' "Facts" 
Nos. 9 through 14 and 16 through 19 refer to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Shaan Sanderson. Mr. Yates' such motion 
was denied. (R.775-76) Mr. Yates' "Facts" Nos. 12 through 13 refer to Mr. Yates' 
Combined Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions in Limine to Exclude Testimony. 
Mr. Yates' such motions were denied. (R.771-76) Mr. Yates' "Fact" No. 15 refers to the 
Affidavit of Suzy Reighard and the Affidavit of Alan Reighard. 
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any of the specific facts raised by the Reighards in their Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO THE RESPONSE OF 
APPELLANT REGARDING ISSUES RAISED IN THE CROSS-APPEAL 
I. THE REIGHARDS PREVAILED IN THE LITIGATION, SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN DETERMINED THE PREVAILING PARTY, AND SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Mr. Yates still fails to acknowledge that Mr. Yates failed to avoid an adverse 
judgment and therefore he cannot be the prevailing party. Rather, it was the Reighards 
who asserted claims against Mr. Yates and were awarded the only monetary judgment. 
Thus, the Reighards were the only parties to receive a monetary recovery in this action 
and they are thus the prevailing party as matter of law and for purposes of an award of 
attorney's fees and costs. The trial court erred by not determining the Reighards the 
prevailing party and subsequently denying their motion for attorney's fees and costs. 
Mr. Yates cites no authority where a defendant who (i) asserts no counterclaims 
against a plaintiff for monetary relief; and (ii) has a judgment awarded against it and in 
favor of the plaintiff can possibly be determined a prevailing party. 
Furthermore, Mr. Yates has failed to object or otherwise respond to the Reighards' 
contention that the case of Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp. is controlling in the present 
circumstances. In Dejavue, the court noted that, when a plaintiff brings multiple claims 
involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least 
some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably 
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incurred in the litigation. {Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 993 
P.2d 222, 227.)(emphasis added). 
In any event, Mr. Yates takes issue with the Reighards' citation to Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1989) for the proposition that, 
"Typically, determining the 'prevailing party5 for purposes of awarding fees and costs is 
quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if plaintiff is awarded a 
judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an 
adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed." {Id.) Mr. Yates contends that such authority 
"refers only to the initial opinion," despite the fact that the portion of the case cited by the 
Reighards is still good law. (See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee at 
p. 14, fn. 11.) Regardless, on petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals noted that, "In 
this case, we remain convinced that application of the net judgment rule does not distort 
the relative success of the parties at trial." {Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 
783 P.2d 551, 558 (Utah App. 1989). The same rings true in the matter at hand -
determining the only party who asserted claims and received any monetary relief in the 
action as the "prevailing party" would not distort the relative success of the parties at 
trial. 
On a related note, Mr. Yates argues in the Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee that he should have been deemed the prevailing party and he should have 
been awarded his attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Yates responds to the Reighards' 
opposition to such a determination by now arguing that his failure to file a motion for 
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attorney's fees or costs does not fail to preserve the issue on appeal. (See Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee at p. 16.) 
However, Mr. Yates failure to file a motion for attorney's fees or costs does fail to 
preserve the issue on appeal. Even the case which Mr. Yates cites in the Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46,1j 18, 217 P.3d 704, 
709, notes that to properly preserve an issue at the trial court, the following must take 
place: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." 
(Id, citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).) 
The issue of Mr. Yates' potential motion for attorney's fees, concededly, was only 
hinted at in an Opposition to the Reighards' motion for attorney's fees and costs.(R.1524-
29). In fact, Mr. Yates never filed such a motion, which precludes the "issue" from being 
raised in a timely fashion. Similarly, the issue of Mr. Yates' motion for attorney's fees 
was not "specifically" raised, as Mr. Yates only alluded to a potential award of attorney's 
fees in his favor as one argument in opposition to the Reighards' motion for attorney's 
fees and costs. Further, Mr. Yates did not introduce any evidence or relevant legal 
authority (contract, statutory or otherwise) in his Opposition that would support an award 
of attorney's fees in his favor. (R. 1524-29). Mr. Yates has never even disclosed any 
amount of attorney's fees or costs that he could conceivably be seeking. Therefore, Mr. 
Yates has failed to preserve the issue on appeal, and he is thus precluded from seeking 
such an award of attorney's fees or costs from the Reighards. 
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In sum, the trial court erred in holding that there was no prevailing party in the 
litigation, the Reighards should have been deemed the prevailing party and should have 
been awarded their attorney's fees and costs. The Reighards set forth evidence at the trial 
court level that over the course of the two and a half year litigation, the Reighards 
incurred a total of approximately $277,100.00 in attorney's fees and $13,214.95 in expert 
expenses. (R. 1450-1472) If this Court holds that the trial court so erred in not awarding 
the Reighards attorney's fees and costs, the Reighards reserve all rights to seek an award 
of attorney's fees and costs incurred through appeal of this matter pursuant to Section 17 
of the REPC and applicable law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OF THE JURY'S VERDICT 
FROM $12,500 TO $7,500 WAS NOT APPROPRIATE 
As set forth in the Reighards' Cross-Appeal, the jury's award to the Reighards was 
reduced from $12,500 to $7,500, ostensibly because the trial court felt that Mr. Yates 
should somehow receive a $5,000 offset from the monies in settlement which the 
Reighards received from the stucco subcontractor at the subject Residence, E. Marshall 
Plastering. 
Mr. Yates argues in his Reply Brief that because the Reighards argued 
(successfully) at trial that there should be no opportunity for the jury to apportion the 
fault of Mr. Yates to non-parties, that the Reighards cannot subsequently take issue with 
the court's subsequent reduction of the jury's verdict. (Reply Brief of Appellant and 
Brief of Cross-Appellee at p. 18.) The Reighards' position on this issue is not 
inconsistent. 
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Notably, Mr. Yates' argument that the $12,500 which the jury awarded to the 
Reighards must be reduced by the $5,000 presupposes that the $5,000 received from E. 
Marshall Plastering was for the same damages caused by Mr. Yates. There is no 
evidence to support such a conclusion, and in fact, the weight of the evidence presented 
at trial demonstrates that the $12,500 in damages which the jury awarded to the 
Reighards were for Mr. Yates' own personal negligence in his grading of the subject 
Residence and his personal negligence in constructing the residence in violation of the 
building code, including inadequate framing and window flashing. In any event, the 
Reighards' argument that fault should not be allocated to the unidentified, non-party 
subcontractors of Mr. Yates was essentially based on the fact that such allocation would 
confuse the jury and leave the jury to speculate in reaching their verdict. 
The Reighards' sole claims in the matter were solely against Mr. Yates as the 
general contractor, builder and seller of the subject Residence. There was no evidence 
presented at trial for the jury to make a competent allocation to non-parties. For example, 
there was no evidence presented to differentiate what the stucco subcontractor's scope of 
work entailed, versus the windows subcontractor's scope of work, versus the framer's 
scope of work, let alone evidence that one of these specific parties failed to meet any 
applicable standard of care. This was raised by counsel for the Reighards at the trial 
court level. (R. 1702, pp. 175-177, 182-193). 
There was no expert or lay witness testimony that purported to make any 
allocation between the non-party subcontractor trades hired by Mr. Yates. In fact, the 
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trial court agreed that such an opportunity for allocation would just invite the jury to 
speculate. (R. 1702, p. 184). 
Notably, counsel for the Reighards objected to the Reighards being identified as a 
settling party in the second paragraph of Jury Instruction No. 43 regarding a potential 
reduction in the jury's verdict from settlement proceeds, and counsel for the Reighards 
specifically requested that the second paragraph be stricken. (R.1702, p.201-02). Counsel 
for the Reighards objected to the ability of the trial court to "make any proper 
adjustments" of the jury's award to the Reighards. (R.1702, p.201-02). In fact, such a 
reduction would not be proper, where here, the evidence presented clearly demonstrated 
that the jury's $12,500 verdict was for Mr. Yates's sole negligence. The jury heard 
evidence that Mr. Yates employed a multitude of subcontractors in the construction of the 
residence, and despite this, the jury still found Mr. Yates independently negligent. 
In addition, the trial court's reduction of the jury's $12,500 verdict is especially 
improper when here, the non-party who is allegedly "at fault" (E. Marshall Plastering) 
was named as a third-party defendant by Mr. Yates, but then was subsequently dismissed 
by Mr. Yates. This demonstrates the lack of any belief by Mr. Yates that a tenable claim 
against E. Marshall Plastering existed, and thus E. Marshall Plastering cannot be 
considered "at fault." Further, in opening statement, counsel for Mr. Yates stated that 
Mr. Yates had sued the stucco subcontractor, E. Marshall Plastering, but then dismissed 
the suit because Mr. Yates came to the conclusion that E. Marshall Plastering was not 
negligent (R.1702, p. 193). 
//// 
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Further adding to the issue is that Mr. Yates did not provide sufficient notice of 
his intent to allocate fault to a non-party (E. Marshall Plastering) 90 days before trial in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 78B-5-821(4), which sets forth that, 
"Fault may not be allocated to a non-party unless a party timely files a description of the 
factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated and information identifying the 
non-party, to the extent known or reasonably available to the party, including name, 
address, telephone number and employer." (Id.) 
Therefore, there was no appropriate basis for the trial court to make a $5,000 
reduction of the jury's $12,500 verdict. Thus, the trial court's subsequent reduction of 
the jury's award is improper and should be set aside by this Court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY UPHELD THE JURY'S 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF MR. YATES REGARDING THE BREACH OF 
CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CAUSES OF 
ACTION 
Mr. Yates argues that the jury's verdict with respect to the Reighards' causes of 
action for Breach of Contract and Negligent Misrepresentation should stand, because 
there was no evidence that Mr. Yates had actual knowledge of the construction defects at 
the residence. While the Reighards dispute this, again, the knowledge of the construction 
defects, including the water intrusion issues, faulty construction, grading issues and 
building code violations, are imputed to Mr. Yates as the general contractor, builder and 
seller of the subject Residence. (Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,1f38, 158 
P.3d 562, 574.) 
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Jury Instruction No. 40 sets forth, "As a matter of law defendant owed a legal 
duty to disclose material information regarding the condition of the residence because 
defendant was a builder and licensed general contractor and own and seller of the 
residence... The law imputes knowledge of building code violations and construction 
defects upon a general contractor/builder because of his specialized knowledge and 
expertise." (R.1427).(emphasis added) 
The Reighards and their expert witnesses identified numerous construction defects 
and building code violations at the Residence. (See Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants at pp. 17 - 19). Thus, as such were imputed to Mr. Yates, the Reighards 
should have prevailed on their Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract 
causes of action. However, they did not. The trial court should have recognized the 
jury's error in this regards and set aside the jury's verdict concerning the Reighards' 
claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract. Again, whether or not 
Mr. Yates had actual knowledge of the construction defects at the subject Residence is 
immaterial as such knowledge was imputed to him. 
The Reighards have argued that the jury did not find in the Reighards' favor on 
their Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract causes of action because the 
jury was confused by the Special Verdict Form, and specifically as to the question as to 
whether, "Did Plaintiffs do all, or substantially all, of the things the contract required 
them to do or were plaintiffs excused from performing their contractual obligations?" 
(R.1444-1449). 
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The jury's confusion in this regard was created by counsel for Mr. Yates in his 
closing argument, that, essentially, the Reighards failed to comply with the mediation 
provision in the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") at Section 15, when no 
evidence was presented, whatsoever, on this issue. (See Brief of Appellees and Cross-
Appellants at pp. 48-49.) Thus, while Mr. Yates argues that the Reighards consented to 
the language of the Special Verdict Form, the Reighards did not know that counsel for 
Mr. Yates would intentionally attempt to confuse the jury in this regard. 
The fact of the matter is that it was Mr. Yates who breached the terms of the REPC 
by failing to disclose to the Reighards the true condition and habitability of the subject 
Residence. Thus, the jury should have awarded the Reighards damages on their breach of 
contract and negligence misrepresentation causes of action. 
Mr. Yates9 reliance on Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing HO A v. Davencourt at 
Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65 is misplaced, as the Reighards have asserted, in 
detail, that this Court in Davencourt held that a contractor/seller owes an independent 
duty to a home purchaser if the contractor/seller has a high degree of knowledge and 
expertise with regard to residential construction and if the home purchaser has a direct 
relationship with the contractor/seller. (2009 UT 65 at % 30). 
The fact that this Court in Davencourt noted that Utah does not recognize an 
independent duty to conform to the building code is not relevant because the source of 
Mr. Yates's independent duty in the present case arises from his relationship to the 
Reighards as the general contractor, builder, and seller of the Residence. In the present 
case, the failure to conform to the building codes is a breach of Mr. Yates' independent 
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duty as the general contractor, builder, and seller of the Residence, which this Court in 
Davencourt recognizes. "In the context of construction defect cases, Utah courts have 
found independent duties in a variety of relationships." (2009 UT 65 at ^ 28). 
Therefore, the trial court erred in not re-opening the judgment entered on the 
jury's verdict and direct entry of judgment in the Reighards favor on their breach of 
contract and negligence misrepresentation causes of action, and this Court should correct 
the trial court's error. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court did not err in holding that Mr. Yates owed an independent duty to 
the Reighards, as he was the general contractor, builder, and the seller of the Residence or 
by ruling that the law imputes knowledge of building code violations and construction 
defects upon a general contractor/builder because of his specialized knowledge and 
expertise. This Court's opinion in Davencourt does not change the result as Mr. Yates 
and the Reighards were in contractual privity in this matter. Also, the economic loss rule 
does not apply to bar the Reighards' negligence claim in light of the personal injuries 
alleged and suffered by the Reighards, and Dr. Eugene Cole properly testified as to the 
Reighards personal injuries. 
In their cross-appeal, the Reighards request that this Court reverse the trial court's 
determination that there was no prevailing party and award the Reighards their attorney's 
fees and costs. The Reighards, who received the only monetary relief at trial, were 
clearly the prevailing party, and should have been so determined by the trial court. Mr. 
Yates was not and could not have been the prevailing party (as recognized by the trial 
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court) and should not have been awarded attorney's fees, especially since he waived any 
entitlement to attorney's fees by not filing a motion for same. The Reighards also request 
that this Court reverse the trial court's reduction of the jury's award to $7,500 as such 
reduction was improper. The Reighards request that the Court re-open the Amended 
Judgment in this matter and enter judgment in the Reighards' favor on their Breach of 
Contract and Negligent Misrepresentation causes of action, as knowledge of the 
numerous construction defects and building code violations at the Residence were 
imputed to Mr. Yates and which establish the Reighards' success on such causes of 
action. 
DATED: March 4. 2011 WEIL & DRAGE, APC 
B 
[STINE E. 
TREVOR O. RESURRECCION 
Attorneys for Appellees and Cross-
Appellants 
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